La tante de Kim Jong-un réapparaît à la télévision

Selon l’agence de presse Yonhap “Kim Kyong-hui, la tante du dirigeant nord-coréen Kim Jong-un, a fait une réapparition sur la chaîne TV d’Etat ce dimanche dans un documentaire retransmis à nouveau, ce qui permet de supposer qu’elle figure toujours au sein de l’élite de la nation communiste en dépit de l’exécution de Jang Song-thaek, son mari et l’ancien mentor du neveu.

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Talks between North Korean and Mongolia held

Talks took place the talks here Tuesday between Ri Ryong Nam, minister of Foreign Trade who doubles as chairman of the DPRK side to the Inter-governmental Committee for Consultation in Economy, Trade, Science and Technology between the DPRK and Mongolia, and Mongolian Minister of Industry and Agriculture Khaltmaa Battulga who is chairman of the Mongolian side to the Committee. Ri Ryong Nam signd already some agreements with the Mongolian side.

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Une amélioration de l’état de l’économie nord-coréenne ?

Il semblerait que l’économie nord-coréenne reprenne de sa vigueur. Les dernières analyses sud-coréennes relatives à l’économie nord-coréenne affirme que le PNB nord-coréen aurait cru de 5% entre 2012 et 2013. Nous devons cependant nous méfier de ce type de données étant donné que :

–          L’économie nord-coréenne part de très bas, donc il est très probable que son taux de croissance soit si élevé

–          La Corée du Nord ne fournit pas de données statistiques depuis plus d’une quarantaine d’années. Toutes les statistiques que nous connaissons donc sont alors relatives aux documents préparés par des autorités et des institutions étrangères (la plupart venant de Chine, de Corée du Sud et du Japon)

–          Est-ce que la croissance économique bénéficie à tout le monde ? Malgré les progrès économiques, il semblerait que ce soit surtout la population de Pyongyang qui bénéficie de ces améliorations.

New DPRK ambassador to Thailand

Mun Song Mo was appointed as DPRK ambassador to Thailand, according to a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK.

Mun Song Mo (born in1948) is a former DPRK ambassador to Ethiopia, Sudan, India (where he served from 2004). He also served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK.

Mun Sung Mo belongs to those who were not expelled by Kim Jong Eun after the Jang Sung Thaek execution. He’s believe to be a close confident to the regent family.

The relations between both countries are complicated. From one side, there are many DPRK companies based in Thailand (such as restaurants), from the other side, Thailand is a country from where DPRK refugees try to reach South Korea. Therefore many DPRK agents are based in Thailand.

WPK Central Committee Secretary Meets Delegation of European Politicians

Kim Yong Il, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), had a friendly talk with the visiting delegation of politicians from various political parties of Europe headed by Chief Executive Officer of Inter Mediate Jonathan Powell, former Downing Street Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, on Tuesday [Please remark the underlining of the connexion to Tony Blair].

Present there were Vice Department Director Pak Kun Gwang and other officials of the C.C., the WPK, Dr. Franz von Daeniken, board director of the Swiss Drossos Fund and former state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Wolfgang M. Nowak from the Social Democratic Party of Germany, spokesman of the executive board of the International Forum of Deutsche Bank and former director-general at the German Federal Chancellery, Par Nuder from the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, chairman of the board of the Third Swedish National Pension Fund and former minister for finance of Sweden, Edmond Alphandery from the Union of People’s Movement of France, president of French CNP International Insurance Company and former minister of economy of France, and other members of the delegation

Kim Yong Il is the member of the Kim family who is responsible for foreign relations. He’s reputated to be highly intelligent and to have a fine knowledge of the western world. Kim Yong Il is also a specialist of Japanese-North Korean relations. He visited several times Japan.

Edmond Alphandery is a famous French politician with a high knowledge on economics. He managed also several companies in France. Edmond Alphandery is especially known for his optimism.

Yongusil 25: Nicolas Levi and New DPRK Analysis from the Polish Academy of Sciences

This article was prepared by colleagues from Sinonk.com, a major platform for research on NK issues.

ommentators and analysts whose focus is north of the DMZ are kept mightily busy by their investigative and research charge, a truth especially so in recent months. Nicolas Levi, a long-time associate of and contributor to Sino-NK, and currently an Assistant Professor of the Polish Academy of Sciences, has been one of those kept working by the latest activities in Pyongyang. Levi’s interests are wider than simply the field of contemporary North Korean politics, extending into philosophic and structural contribution made to society and culture in the wider Korean Peninsula.

Levi’s policy paper for The Polish Institute of International Affairs entitled “Insanity or Part of a Plan? Prospects for Changes to North Korean Domestic and Foreign Policies” refers to Hazel Smith’s conceptualization of the analytic triad: North Korea as “mad, sad or rational actor“  Levi’s well structured review and coagulation of themes in contemporary systems and political scholarship is therefore well grounded theoretically.

Primarily Dr. Levi seeks to place the developing themes of economic and developmental reform within North Korea’s institutions in the wider frame of institutional developmental, especially post-Jang. Levi sees, intriguingly, the consolidation of power around the person and institution of Kim Jong-un in his initial years of reign as a diminution of the power, place and authority of the Korean People’s Army and the wider institutional complex of the North Korean military.

Levi’s analysis might also feed into the direction of last week’s Yongusil focusing on Green and Denney’s utilization of Peter Evan’s “pockets of efficiency” within a North Korean developmental context. We might see Jang’s death and the inevitable collapse in its wake of those “pockets of efficiency” controlled by him or his connected cohort as a reassertion of military control over those pockets, those institutions forming them and the streams of trade and capital around which they were constructed.

Levi also raises the issue of North Korean foreign policy and how this diminution of military influence within its governmental and developmental institutions might relate to the Special Economic Zones such as Kaesong and Rason, the majority of which are connected, at least in terms of their supply lines to external/foreign partners.

Levi posits the possibility that a pre-Jang reduction in military authority might give Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership apparatus some scope for loosening to reducing the level of hostility it exposes foreign nations to in its media and official narratives and perhaps some possibility for diplomatic breakthroughs. Dr. Levi sets out his framework for diplomatic action and engagement given this context, but it will be fascinating to watch the impact of the collapse of Jang’s ‘faction’ or support network on Pyongyang’s future relations with those with whom it engaged.

Nicolas Levi has also contributed a more trans-peninsular and East Asian analysis of the impact of Confucianism on contemporary South Korean and Japanese culture to the latest edition of the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Journal Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia. In his article for this journal, Levi tracks the impact of Confucian filial principles in the modern age on the differing nationalisms either side of the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The same issue also includes work from the esteemed Russian academic Larisa Zabrovskaia (a member of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the People of the Far East, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, whose work we have covered before at the Yongusil) writing on diplomatic relations in East Asian following the Fukushima incident and Frauka Kempka (of Martin Luther University, Halle Wittenberg), on the contrasting conceptions of ethnic homogeneity between Germany and East Asian nations. It seems that Levi (and others’ work), is representative of a vibrant and multi-focused Polish academy, busy, as usual at analysis and investigation.

Remplacements économiques / changements ministériels en Corée du Nord

L’économie nord-coréenne était sous le contrôle de la famille des Jang et tout particulièrement de sociétés qui étaient affiliées au Ministère de l’Administration. Certaines d’entre elles étaient tout particulièrement dans le domaine des mines et de l’industrie des matières premières. Cela peut probablement expliqué le fait suivant

La quantité de charbon exporté entre la Corée du Nord et la Chine a été multipliée par 4 (voire 5) entre le début des années 2000 en passant de 2-3 millions de tonnes à plus de 10 millions en 2011. Cet accroissement des exportations aurait été partiellement du à la politique prochinoise de Jang Sung Thaek. Sa dénomination risque de changer le cap de ces échanges.

C’est donc pourquoi afin de reprendre la main dessus, Kim Jong Eun en coopération avec Choe Yong Rim et du cercle des anciens généraux ont décidé de faire démissionner les personnalités responsables de certaines activités des matières premières. A noter cependant : tous n’ont pas été démissionnés (je pense tout particulièrement à Jon Sung Hun, un économiste nord-coréen).

Les remplacements economiques du cabinet ministériel.

Han Hyo Yon

Ancien ministre de l’industrie des métaux: il a été remplacé par Kim Yong Gwang en tout début janvier.

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Kim Yong Kwang

 Kang Min Chol

Kang Min Chol, Le ministre nord-coréen de l’industrie minière a été remplacé par Ri Hak Chol en début janvier 2014. Kang Min Chol appartenait au réseau de patronage de Jang Sung Thaek. Kang Min Chol occupait ce poste depuis novembre 2005. Veuillez noter que bien que Kang ait été un proche de Jang Sung Thaek, il occupait son poste lors de la période d’exil de Jang (2004-2007).  Ri Hak Chol a souvent voyagé en Europe et est un homme d’affaire nord-coréen. Kang Min Chol a été arrêté.

Kim Yong Ho

Ancien secrétaire du Cabinet ministériel: il a été remplacé par Kim Jong Ha.

Rim Nam Su

Rim Nam Su, ancien ministre de l’industrie du Charbon a été remplacé par Mun Myong Hak. Celui-ci a été présenté lors d’un anniversaire au Complexe Minier de Pukchang (partie septentrionale de la Corée du Nord).